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STRANGERS AND BROTHERS: 
A HOMILY ON TRANSRACIAL 
ADOPTION·· 
CARL E. SCHNEIDER • 
And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and tempted him, saying, 
Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? He said unto him, What 
is written in the law? ... And he answering said, Thou shalt love the 
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy 
strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself. And he 
said unto him, Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou shalt live. 
But he . .. said unto Jesus, And who is my neighbour? 
Luke 10:25-29 
INTRODUCTION: A PARABLE AND A HISTORY 
The common law speaks to us in parables. Ours is Drummond v. 
Fulton County Department of Family and Children's Services. 1 Just 
before Christmas 1973, a boy named Timmy was born to a white 
mother and a black father. A month later, his mother was declared 
unfit, and the Department of Family and Children Services placed 
Timmy with white foster parents - Robert and Mildred Drummond. 
The Drummonds were "excellent" and "loving" parents, and Timmy 
grew into "an extremely bright, highly verbal, outgoing 15-month baby 
boy." 
Then the Drummonds asked to adopt Timmy. The Department's 
reviews of the Drummonds' devotion to Timmy remained enthusiastic, 
•• This article was delivered at the John FitzRandolph Lecture at the Whittier Law 
School on September I 0, 2002. The published version is taken directly from the text 
of the lecture as it was delivered. Hence the Review has not had an opportunity to edit 
the text and should not be held responsible for errors or infelicities. They are mine 
alone. For the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U 
Chicago L Rev 1343 (1986), I follow the University of Chicago Manual of Legal 
Citation (Lawyers Co-operative, 1989). 
'Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law & Professor of Internal Medicine, University 
of Michigan. I am grateful for the helpful of my research assistants, Sara K. Orr and 
Lance Rich. And I am glad to thank Kim Forde-Mazrui, Marsha Garrison, and Suellyn 
Scarnecchia for their perceptive, learned, and wise comments on an earlier draft of this 
lecture. 
l. 563 F2d 1200 (1977, 5th Circuit en bane). 
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if condescending,2 but the Department told the Drummonds that 
Timmy needed a black family. The Drummonds "'stated they could let 
Timothy go to a young, energetic, religious, adoptive couple. They 
expressed primary concern that he not be moved from their home to 
another foster home .... They feel that separation from Timothy will 
tear their hearts out but that they can do it because it would be best for 
Timothy in the long run.'"3 In August 1975, a Department evaluation 
concluded that the Drummonds had given Timmy "'excellent care"' 
and had "'accepted a mixed race child and ... handled the attendant 
problems well.'" In September, a court terminated Timmy's parents' 
rights and freed him for adoption. The Drummonds said they would 
"'do anything we [the social workers] suggested to go through a series 
of intensive interviews with black caseworker [sic] to help them 
understand the black culture and heritage, to read books and other 
literature in order to educate themselves in the black experience, and to 
talk with their own black friends at work about their feelings and 
experiences about being black."'4 The social workers acknowledged 
that "'[t]he fact that there presently are no appropriate homes for 
Timmy, and the fact that he might also experience some rejection by 
some members of the black community due to his 'whiteness' is [sic] 
also a consideration."'5 In November 1975, when Timmy was almost 
two years old, the Department told the Drummonds "that Timmy will 
be better off adopted by a black couple."6 
The Drummonds sued to be allowed to adopt, and after their 
odyssey through the Georgia and federal courts, the Fifth Circuit en 
bane (on November 28, 1977, when Timmy was almost four) held 
against the Drummonds, since "'the difficulties inherent in interracial 
adoption' justify the consideration of 'race as a relevant factor .... "'7 
Timmy Drummond is emblematic of no small number of children 
adoption agencies have thought should be adopted only by a black 
couple. Historically, agencies generally prevented parents from 
adopting interracially. But in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the racial 
climate shifted and minority children's need for homes was pressing. 
By the middle to late 1960s, "transracial adoption seemed to be the 'in' 
thing for progressive agencies."8 However, there was soon a 
2. "Because the Drummonds are not from the kind of upper-middle class 
achievement oriented home most caseworkers come from it does make it hard to 
visualize seeing Timmy grow up 'successfully' in this kind of culture." Drummond v. 
Fulton County Department of Family & Children's Services, 547 F2d 835, 846 (1977). 
3. /d. at 839. 
4. /d. at 845. 
5. 547 F2d at 846. 
6. /d. at 846. 
7. 563 F2d at 1205, quoting Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La. 
1972) (three-judge court). 
8. Jacqueline Macaulay & Stewart Macaulay, Adoption for Black Children: A Case 
Study of Expert Discretion, 1 Research in Law & Sociology 265, 283 (1978). 
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"counterrevolution ... sparked by the National Association of Black 
Social Workers,"9 which vowed to "work to end this particular form of 
genocide." 10 "This counterrevolution cut transracial adoption by 39% 
in a single year, just when the movement seemed to be growing 
rapidly." 11 The critics of transracial adoption argued that the only 
legitimate answer to the problem of unplaced black children was to 
find black parents by, for example, having adoptions of black children 
handled only by black social workers, subsidizing adoptions of black 
children by black parents, and recognizing informal adoption by black 
extended families. 
Despite efforts of this kind, 12 black children languished in the 
limbo of foster care. 13 In 1994, Congress passed, and in 1996 it tried to 
sharpen, the Multiethnic Placement Act, which sought to keep searches 
for black adoptive parents from preventing black children from being 
9. /d. at 287. 
10. Margaret Howard, Trans racial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests 
Standard, 59 Notre Dame L Rev 503, 518 (1984). 
11. Macaulay & Macaulay, Adoption for Black Children at 287-88. 
12. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?: The Politics of Race 
Matching in Adoption, 139 U Penn L Rev 1163, 1193 - 1207 (1991). Writing before 
the Multiethnic Placement Act (see the next paragraph), Professor Bartholet observed, 
"The matching policies of today place a high priority on expanding the pool of 
prospective black adoptive parents so placements can be made without utilizing the 
waiting white pool. ... [P]rograms have been created to recruit black parents, subsidies 
have been provided to encourage them to adopt, and traditional parental screening 
criteria have been revised." More specifically, one article written around the time 
MEP A was enacted reported that 
the importance attached to finding minority parents is such 
that they are actively screened in, to the extent of 
"canvassing bars, pool halls, speaking to ministers and 
their church groups, women's clubs, and simply stopping 
people in the street." ... Considerable latitude is afforded 
to minority parents: a couple, for example, should not be 
rejected merely because the husband or boyfriend has no 
interest in adopting a child and refuses to attend any 
interviews. Peter Hayes, Transracial Adoption: Politics 
and Ideology, 77 Child Welfare 301, 304 (1993). 
13. Professor Bartholet wrote that "some notable efforts" to recruit black adoptive 
parents "have had some success in encouraging black families to consider adoption." 
Bartholet at 1196. "Nonetheless, the numbers mismatch continues .... [B]oth the 
number of children in foster care and the proportion that is black have been growing." 
/d. at 1188. Professor Howard concluded that "[c]urrent figures are hard to locate, but 
only a small number of transracial placements are still being made. Since no data 
suggest that more black homes have become available, the inevitable conclusion is that 
adoptable black children remain in foster homes and institutions." Howard, 59 Notre 
Dame L Rev at 518. HHS reported in January 2000 that 51% of all foster children 
waiting for adoption are black, 11% are Hispanic; and 32% are white. Black children 
are 44% of the foster care population. 
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adopted at all. 14 MEPA, however, seems to have made it scarcely 
easier for white parents to adopt black children, evidently because 
many adoption agencies implacably resist transracial adoptions, 15 the 
HHS regulations that implement MEPA leave the agencies leeway, and 
enforcement has not been vigorous. 16 
THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS 
Who were Timmy's parents? He was legally an orphan. Should 
he have been adopted by his foster parents, the Drummonds? This is 
classically a question for family law. Primarily, family law resolves 
disputes among individuals about how their lives in families should be 
organized. But family law also referees the claims of various 
collectivities to influence people's intimate lives. These collectivities 
include families, ethnic and religious groups, and the broader 
community as it is represented by the government. Tensions among 
these collectivities are so Protean that no stable resolution of them is 
14. Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-382, 551-554, 108 Stat 4056, 
4056-57 (codified as amended at 42 USC 1996(b) and 42 U.S.C. 5115a (1994)). 
MEPA was amended by the Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of 1996, in the 
Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-188, 1808(c), 110 Stat 1755, 
1904 (codified as 42 USC 1996(b)). 
15. Professor Bartholet writes, "Adoption agency bureaucrats moved swiftly to 
accommodate the position taken by the NABSW." She quotes Macaulay & Macaulay 
at 294 - 300: "When the black social work community turned professional attitudes 
around, it seemed prudent to do such things as to tum responsibility for all black 
children over to black social workers and agencies. The transracial adoptive parent 
organizations might be unhappy, but they were less of a threat than black power 
exercised directly or through the workers' professional peers." 139 UPenn L Rev at 
1181. By the time of MEPA, "strong institutional opposition to ... transracial 
adoption ... has spread from the National Association of Black Social Workers ... to 
child welfare agencies throughout the United States and Britain. Today, child care 
professionals in both countries routinely stress the importance of race-similarity 
between parents and children and discourage or prohibit TRA." Hayes, 77 Child 
Welfare at 301. Similarly, Moran notes that although "many Americans, black and 
white, support transracial placements, some social workers are still vehemently 
opposed to them. As a result, adoption across the color line continues to be a rarity, 
especially for black children who are not racially mixed." Rachel F. Moran, 
Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race and Romance 128-129 (U Chicago Press, 
2001). 
16. Systematic evidence on this issue is hard to find, but my impressions have been 
much assisted by an admirable memorandum my research assistant, Lance Rich, is 
preparing for publication. While the evidence about MEPA's success is not 
encouraging, there is reason to think that another recent federal statute B the Adoption 
and Safe Families Act, Pub L No 105-89, 111 Stat 2115 B has evidently hastened the 
adoption of foster care children. That act, among other things, gives states financial 
incentives to move children out of foster care. In 1999 (the last year for which we 
have figures), the number of finalized adoptions of children in foster care increased 
28%. Since so many of the children available for adoption in foster care are black, and 
since there is no strong reason to believe the number of black adoptive parents has 
radically increased, it seems likely that transracial adoptions account for part of the 
increase. 
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plausible. Nevertheless, if there is a trend, it is toward favoring the 
choices of individuals, toward the adage that, in America, all affinities 
are elective. 17 
To be sure, family law attributes special status to "the family" by, 
for example, exalting "family autonomy." But that principle is at heart 
a generalization about what best promotes the interests of the 
individuals within the family and a presumption readily abrogated to 
protect individuals from the power of families or their dominant 
members. Furthermore, the primacy of the family has been eroded by 
developments like no-fault divorce and a mounting willingness to 
intervene in families to pursue and punish familial violence. 18 Indeed, 
we have increasingly deinstitutionalized the family and ratified as a 
family whatever relationships individuals choose to call one. 19 So I 
repeat: in America, all affinities are elective. 
Family law has been even more loath to defer to the authority of 
social groups than to the autonomy of families. Groups may govern 
people, but only by their consent. Perhaps the greatest exception is one 
that almost proves the rule: The Indian Child Welfare Act of 197820 
accords tribes authority over the custody of Indian children that Indian 
parents have tried in vain to evade.21 In enacting that statute, 
"Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian 
children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes 
themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-
Indians."22 But ICWA is special because the group is special -
American law attributes to tribes kind of sovereign authority that, 
however partial, no other group can boast. 
But can family law's skepticism of groups' authority be squared 
with its avowals of allegiance to pluralism? Yes: A pluralist regime 
serves individuals by offering them an array of affinities to elect.23 
Thus family law has resisted justifying pluralism on the grounds that it 
benefits the group itself. Indeed, it has doubted whether it is useful to 
talk about "groups," as opposed to collections of individuals.24 And it 
17. Although the phrase beautifully fits the American case, it was originally the title 
of a novel by Goethe. 
18. See generally Carl E. Schneider, Family Law in the Age of Distrust, 33 Family 
L Q 447 (Fall 1999); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of 
American Family Law, 83 Michigan L Rev 1803 (1985). 
19. See, for one recent example, Baker v. Vermont, 744 A2d 864 (1999). See 
generally Carl E. Schneider & Margaret F. Brinig, An Invitation to Family Law: 
Principles, Process, and Perspectives 1306-17 (2d ed) (West, 2001 ). 
20. 25 usc§§ 1901-1963. 
21. See, for example, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 US 30 
(1989). 
22. !d. at 49. 
23. See e.g. Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, Dissent 67 (Winter 
1994). 
24. A good discussion of this problem is Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and 
Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society (U California Press, 1986). 
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has feared giving power to groups - as to families - exactly because it 
fears for the individuals within the group. Pierce v. Society of Sisters25 
thought the Constitution "precludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children." But is standardization more appealing when 
enforced by the church instead of the state?26 
Presiding over the conflicts among individual, family, and group-
and representing interests of its own - is the state. But family law 
supposes that the state should stay its hand, should accommodate 
individuals' preferences wherever possible, and should intervene 
principally to protect the welfare of individuals. So what rules should 
the state employ to govern the dispute over Timmy? How should the 
claims of individual, family, group, and state be analyzed? 
THE CHILD'S CLAIM 
If all affinities are elective, Timmy himself should chose his 
parents. But he is too young. Ordinarily, parents choose for their 
children, but the very issue is who Timmy's parents are. Still, many of 
the reasons we make parents trustees for their children fit the 
Drummonds - they knew him best, they loved him most. For such 
reasons, the Supreme Court has intimated that foster parents like the 
Drummonds may have a constitutional interest in their relationship 
with their foster children.27 
But even if Timmy cannot speak for himself and the Drummonds 
cannot speak for him, a court could consider what he might have said. 
What - to invoke the classic custody test - were his best interests? If 
one truth is universally acknowledged, it is that children need parents, 
need people wholly committed to them to whom they are wholly 
committed. Timothy had parents in the Drummonds. Leaving them 
would be a little Gethsemane.28 The Department had no black adoptive 
parents in view, and the social workers thought it could take years to 
find them. Even were the Drummonds mediocre parents, they might 
still be better than no parents at all. But even the Department called 
them exceptional parents. 
Such persuasive justifications for supposing Timmy would 
choose the Drummonds could only be rebutted by impressive reasons. 
The Drummond court essentially accepted two. First, it thought "a 
child and adoptive parents can best adjust to a normal family 
relationship if the child is placed with adoptive parents who could have 
25. 268 us 510 (1925). 
26. "[T]hough the nation-state is less tolerant of groups, it may well force groups to 
be more tolerant of individuals." Michael Walzer, On Toleration 27 (Yale U Press, 
1997). 
27. See Smith v. Offer, 431 US 816 (1977). 
28. The literature on children's need for reliable ties with their parents and 
children's pain when those ties are broken is too vast and too familiar to need citation. 
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actually parented him."29 Second, it deferred to a purported 
"professional literature" and to "the accumulated experience of 
unbiased professionals" and their supposed conclusion that white 
parents might "not be able to cope with the [black] child's problems."30 
There was no evidence that either of these problems had troubled 
Timmy and the Drummonds. But might they do so later? In fact, the 
literature reaches quite a different conclusion than the court imagined. 
Studies of transracial adoptions overwhelmingly find that black 
children adopted by white parents do just as well on all the plausible 
measures as children adopted by black parents. 31 
Furthermore, the specific injuries transracial adoption is alleged 
to inflict are not well demonstrated. A more specific statement of those 
injuries comes from a District of Columbia "Drummoncf' -Petition of 
R.M.G. 32 R.M.G's opinions feared that "the child may not perceive 
herself as black or develop an identity as a black person"33 and that "the 
child may experience a 'conflict of loyalties' as she grows older."34 
Timmy might well be uncertain about his identity. Many children are. 
Adopted children especially may be. Children of inter-racial marriages 
likewise may be specially concerned about their identity. But would 
Timmy's identity be any more disturbed by white parents than it 
already was complicated by the circumstances of his birth and his 
separation from the Drummonds? 
And need struggling with his identity injure Timmy? Were that 
struggle injurious, we would expect to see signs in the empirical 
research, but we do not. On the contrary, there is evidence that 
transracially adopted children are generally content with their racial 
identities. Furthermore, mediating conflicting identities is what most 
of us do. America's efflorescing cosmopolitanism grants us the gift of 
multiple, flexible identities,35 and Americans increasingly believe that 
29. 563 F2d at 1205-1206. 
30. 563 F2d at 1205. 
31. The studies as of 1991 are surveyed at some length in Elizabeth Bartholet, 
Where Do Black Children Belong?: The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U 
Pennsylvania L Rev 1163 (1991). The studies as of 2000 are briefly but informatively 
surveyed in Rita J. Simon & Rhonda M. Roorda, In Their Own Voices: Transracial 
Adoptees Tell Their Stories 13-27 (Columbia U Press, 2000). 
32. 454 A2d 776 (DC App 1982). 
33. /d. at 802. 
34. /d .. 
35. See David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism 3 - 4 
(Basic Books, 1995): 
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life's central moral enterprise is the interminable remodeling project of 
creating and revising one's identity by the choices one makes from the 
givens of one's past and the possibilities of one's present.36 On this 
view, Timmy's questions about identity are not a crucifixion; they are 
questions we all profit by asking. 
The R.M.G. opinions also observed that a boy like Timmy might 
face more social obloquy growing up in a white than a black family.37 
But the Supreme Court's opinion in Palmore v. SidotP8 seems to 
preclude that argument. There the trial court had awarded custody to 
the white child's white father because the court thought she would 
suffer from the community's reaction to her white mother's 
cohabitation with a black man. The Supreme Court acknowledged the 
risk but had "little difficulty" concluding that "the reality of private 
biases and the possible injury they might inflict" were constitutionally 
irrelevant. And, constitutional concerns aside, some courts asked to 
deny custody to parents with eccentric religious views have wondered 
whether the hostility those views provoke must harm and might benefit 
children. "We are not unaware that deviation from the normal often 
brings ridicule and criticism. We reject, however, the notion that it is 
necessarily the basis for implanting neuroses. Criticism is the crucible 
in which character is tested."39 
Pluralism respects inherited boundaries and locates 
individuals within one or another of a series of ethno-racial 
groups to be protected and preserved. Cosmopolitanism is 
more wary of traditional enclosures and favors voluntary 
affiliations. Cosmopolitanism promotes multiple identities, 
emphasizes the dynamic and changing character of many 
groups, and is responsive to the potential for creating new 
cultural combinations. Pluralism sees in cosmopolitanism 
a threat to identity, while cosmopolitanism sees in 
pluralism a provincial unwillingness to engage the complex 
dilemmas and opportunities actually presented by 
contemporary life. 
36. See my criticism of courts that try to adjudicate disputes over religious 
education between divorced parents of different religions in Carl E. Schneider, 
Religion and Child Custody, 25 U Michigan J L Reform 879, 897- 904 (1992). 
37. R.M.G., 454 A2d at 803: 
When some people see a child whose race is different from 
that of his parents, they assume he is an illegitimate child 
or the product of a multi-racial marriage C circumstances 
they may disapprove of. Other people overreact in a 
well-meaning way, commenting on how wonderful it is to 
adopt a minority child. But however well-intentioned, such 
reactions have the effect of emphasizing to the child that he 
is "different," and can lead to a sense of isolation. 
38. 466 us 429 (1984). 
39. Smith v. Smith, 367 P2d 230,233 (Ariz 1961). Similarly: "There may also be a 
value in letting the child see, even at an early age, the religious models between which 
it is likely to be led to choose in later life. And it is suggested, sometimes, that a 
diversity of religious experience is itself a sound stimulant for a child." Felton v. 
Felton, 418 NE2d 606,607-08 (Mass 1981). 
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Another of R.M.G.'s arguments against transracial adoption is 
one a social worker made to the Drummonds: that in a black home 
Timmy "would be given guidance from people of the black race as to 
how to protect himself and win difficult situations. It would be much 
easier for a black parent to give him these skills than would a white 
parent, as they would be teaching him from their own experience."40 
Perhaps. But consider the testimony of Kim Forde-Mazrui, who is the 
son of a black father and a white mother and the adoptive father of a 
white child. He criticizes the "coping skills" argument because it 
falsely "assumes that a person must experience racism first hand ... to 
teach a child how to cope with it."41 He asks, "Must a parent have 
worn glasses, been fat, worn braces, or been short in order to help her 
child who, while on the playground, is called 'four eyes,' 'fatso,' 
'tinsel teeth,' or 'shrimp' ?"42 In addition, Professor Forde-Mazrui 
thinks black children of white parents may acquire some "coping" 
advantages, such as a greater ease in dealing with white people.43 
All the harms we have canvassed could occur. But they are 
speculations, speculations about problems likeliest to occur, if they 
occur at all, years into the future. They are thus kinds of harm child-
custody law has increasingly distrusted. That law now emphasizes the 
quality of the relationship between the child and would-be custodians. 
Furthermore, the harms we have canvassed are only a few of the many 
factors that will affect that relationship, Timmy's happiness as a child, 
and his worth as a man. Not least, the Drummonds had it right when 
they told a social worker that "they felt that the most important thing 
Timmy needed to be secure and happy about himself, was to have 
parents who truly loved him." And all the evidence unites to proclaim 
that Timmy's relationship with the Drummonds was exemplary. 
And that leads us to a last and crucial consideration: The issue is 
not whether the Drummonds might be imperfect, for all custodians are; 
it is which custodian will serve him best. The realistic alternative to 
adoption by white parents for Timmy and many black children is 
languishing in a foster-care system that is a woeful alternative even to 
mediocre parents. And, most ironically, foster parents are likely to be 
white. For the foreseeable future, then, Timmy's choice is between life 
as an orphan and life with the only parents he had ever known, the 
parents who loved him, the parents he loved. Was this a choice? 
40. 547 F2d at 844. To like effect, see R.M.G., 454 A2d at 802 - 03, and . 
NABSW's Position on Trans-Racial Adoption, 5 National Association of Black Social 
Workers Journal 9 (Summer 1973). 
41. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of 
Black and Biracial Children, 92 Michigan L Rev 925, 953 (February 1994). I am 
proud to say that Professor Forde-Mazrui was once my research assistant. 
42. /d. at 954. 
43. /d. at 951. 
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THE ETHNIC CLAIM 
I have just argued that if we heed the principle that all affinities 
are elective by making for Timmy the choice he would make for 
himself, we would confide him to the care and comfort of the 
Drummonds. But did his race have an interest in his being raised by 
members of that race? The most influential sentence ever written 
about transracial adoption reviled it as genocide.44 The National 
Association of Black Social Workers's accusation rested partly on "the 
philosophy that we need our own to build a strong nation."45 The 
NABSW's president asserted in 1985 that it was protecting "the rights 
of Black children, Black families, and the Black community. We view 
the placement of Black children in white homes as a hostile act against 
our community. It is a blatant form of race and cultural genocide."46 
Generally, groups' interests in their children are recognized by 
honoring parents' preferences. For example, children ordinarily take 
the religion their parents assign them - cujus regio, ejus religio - and 
parents ordinarily assign children their own religion. Even Wisconsin 
v. Yode/7 is not to the contrary. There the Supreme Court found 
unconstitutional a statute that required Amish children to attend ninth 
and tenth grades. The opinion famously celebrates the virtues of the 
Amish and denounces the statute's menace to their life, their religion, 
and their community. However, Yoder's facts and reasoning are less 
consoling than its language to any argument that a group has a claim to 
its children that is independent of their parents' claim. Mr. Yoder was 
a parent, and the parents and the community were as one. In addition, 
the Court independently examined whether the children would be 
injured by their parents' and their community's arguments and 
concluded that they would not be. 
But let us take seriously Yoder's rhapsodic language about the 
Amish community's interests in their children. Are the interests of 
Timmy's race in his choice of parents then legally cognizable? This 
question provokes another: What is Timmy's race? If all affinities are 
elective, only Timmy can say. But here we might imagine two 
exceptions to the elective-affinities principle. First, if race is a 
"natural" category, if "science" identifies human characteristics that 
reliably define "race," we might freely assign children to races. But 
who today believes this? "Biologists, geneticists, and physical 
anthropologists, among others, long ago reached a common 
understanding that race is not a "scientific" concept rooted in 
44. Quoted in Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best 
Interests Standard, 59 Notre Dame L Rev 503, 518 (1984). 
45. Quoted/d. at517. 
46. Quoted in R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' 
Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 Yale L J 875,919 n 190 
(1998). 
47. 406 us 205 (1972). 
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discernible biological differences. "48 
Second, assigning children to races might be legitimate if races 
are social categories about whose membership there is a stable 
consensus. However, there has been no such consensus historically or 
today. Races have changed unsettlingly over time and remain 
unsettled. For example, Jews were once considered a race, and "Asian" 
comprehends many peoples who do not cheerfully group themselves 
49 together. 
But has not a widely accepted understanding of "black" evolved-
the "one-drop" rule which essentially calls "black" anyone with any 
"black" ancestor, however remote?50 That rule captures the way many, 
perhaps most, Americans define "black," but it must also evoke 
unease, since its Jim Crow origins51 and Niirnberg parallels are 
palpable and odious. In any event, should that rule override the 
elective-affinities principle? While many people who fit the definition 
embrace it, not all do. Some pass for white. Some people who call 
themselves Indian or Hispanic have black ancestors.52 "Many first-
generation Black immigrants ... distance themselves from, subscribe 
to negative stereotypes of, and believe that, as ethnic immigrants, they 
are accorded a higher status than, Black Americans."53 Perhaps most 
significantly, interracial marriages are multiplying, although they 
48. Michael A. Omi, The Changing Meaning of Race, in Neil J. Smelser, William 
Julius Wilson, & Faith Mitchell, eds, America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their 
Consequences 243 (National Academy Press, 2001). For example, "In 1997 the 
American Anthropological Association counseled the federal government to phase out 
use of the term 'race' in the collection of data because the concept has no scientific 
justification in human biology." !d. at 254. 
49. Even subracial groupings can provoke disagreement: "Many Americans from 
Central America think of themselves as 'mestizo,' a term that refers to a mixture of 
Central American Indian and European ancestry. Among those surveyed in the 
National Latino Political Survey in 1989, the greatest number of respondents chose to 
be labeled by their country of origin, as opposed to 'pan-ethnic' terms such as 
'Hispanic' or 'Latino."' Amitai Etzioni, The Monochrome Society 20 (Princeton U 
Press, 2001). 
50. F. James Davis, Who Is Black?: One Nation's Definition (U Pennsylvania Press, 
1991). 
51. !d. at 15. 
52. "Large numbers of Hispanics with some black ancestry have succeeded in 
defining themselves as Hispanics or Latinos." /d. at 158. "[A] great many people 
classed as Indians have some black background." !d. at 21. 
53. Michael A. Omi, The Changing Meaning of Race, in Neil J. Smelser, William 
Julius Wilson, & Faith Mitchell, eds, America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their 
Consequences 246 (National Academy Press, 2001). Professor Omi continues, 
"Children of Black immigrants, who lack their parents' distinctive accents, have more 
choice in assuming different identities. Some try to defy racial classification as 'Black 
Americans' by strategically asserting their ethnic identity in specific encounters with 
Whites. Others simply see themselves as 'Americans."' Nor are people who meet the 
one-drop test necessarily welcomed as black by blacks. "Some groups, such as Black 
Cubans in Miami, encounter marginalization from both Black and Hispanic American 
communities." !d. at 249. 
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remain unusual between blacks and whites.54 These marriages 
significantly produce children who are likely - ever more likely - to 
regard themselves as something other than a member of either race 
simpliciter. 
In short, even race can be an elective affinity. As Moran notes, 
"people readily shift their identities in response to changing policy, 
such as preferential treatment under affirmative action 
programs .... [F]rom 1950 to 1990, the Native American population in 
the United States grew over fivefold from 377,000 to 1.96 million."55 
More significantly for our purposes, a growing number of Americans 
explicitly call themselves biracial and insist on their right to designate 
themselves that way.56 They passionately contend that they draw from 
multiple heritages and are entitled to have all of them acknowledged. 57 
This makes it yet more perilous to assign people to races. It 
specifically makes it hard to assign Timmy to a race, for, while we 
have perhaps been assuming he is black, his mother was white and his 
father was black. Indeed, in the likely course of things, Timmy would 
have lived only with his mother and thus grown up in a white 
household. 
In sum, it is harder to assign children a race than one might think, 
and we might well flinch from deciding, for example, the race of the 
54. "Between a quarter and a third of all marriages involving Japanese Americans 
are now out-group marriages. More indigenous people marry outside the Indigenous 
bloc than marry within it. Even marriages between African Americans and whites, 
prohibited in some States as late as the 1960s, have increased by 300 percent since 
1970." David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism 41 B 42 
(Basic Books, 1995). 
55. Rachel F. Moran, Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race and Romance 
108 (U Chicago Press, 2001). One striking confirmation of this proposition comes 
from 
the growing body of evidence indicating that ethnic and racial 
identities are far more sensitive to method of data collection 
than a simple biological model would suggest. Reinterview 
studies, for example, have demonstrated that respondent-
reported race and interviewer-reported race are not always 
consistent .... Similarly, other research has also 
demonstrated that self-reports are not always consistent with 
either self or proxy reports at reinterview . . . , and that 
responses to self-administered and interviewer-administered 
questionnaires are inconsistent as well. Timothy P. Johnson et 
al, Dimensions of Self Identification Among Multiracial and 
Multiethnic Respondents in Survey Interviews, at 
<http://www .census.gov/prod/2/gen/96arc/iiiajohn.pdf> pg. 7. 
56. For example, 5.4% of the population classified itself as "others" in the 2000 
census, up from 4% in 1990. Amitai Etzioni, The Monochrome Society 26 (Princeton 
U Press, 2001). 
57. In one study, "multiracial respondents largely prefer[red] a question format that 
permits them to self-identify themselves as 'multiracial.' Many, in fact, expressed 
negative emotional reactions to their common experience of forced categorization into 
a single racial group or relegation to a residual 'Other-specify' category." Timothy P. 
Johnson et al at 7 B 8. 
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child of a Jewish father and a mother who "is of Black, American 
Indian and Irish heritage."58 But the problem is not just assigning a 
race to the child; it is also attributing opinions to the race. Who speaks 
for any race in the way representatives of Amish communities speak 
for them? Amish communities are homogeneous and structured, and 
they maintain orthodoxy through disciplined resistance to the 
pluralizing influence of the world and by splitting into separate 
communities when divided by doctrinal disputes. In contrast, blacks 
are an eighth of the American population, geographically dispersed, 
and socially and culturally heterogeneous. 
Most significantly, polls indicate that a substantial majority of 
black people oppose restrictions on transracial adoption.59 For 
example, in 1991 seventy-one percent of black Americans supported 
transracial adoption.ffl They may, for instance, feel that their race's 
interests regarding Timmy would not be best served by severing him 
from the only parents he ever knew, parents with whom he flourished, 
and expelling him into a world of strangers. 
Let me put the point differently. At a conference I once cited the 
views on transracial adoption of one black academic. Another black 
academic angrily insisted that the first was not a "real" black and that 
his opinions therefore had to be ignored B even scorned B in favor of 
her authentic views. Were the government to defer to "the group" in 
choosing parents for Timmy it would have to decide what position a 
"genuinely" black person would take. It is hardly clear that races have 
orthodoxies or that we should want them to. In any event, no court is 
well situated to ascertain any race's orthodoxy, and since ascertaining 
orthodoxy inevitably influences it, we should not want a court to try.61 
58. Tubwon v. Weisberg, 394 NW2d 601,604 (Minn App 1986). 
59. Many blacks reject the views of the NABSW in other respects. For example, 
"48% of blacks and 47% of whites agreed that the Census Bureau should stop 
collecting information on race and ethnicity 'in an effort to move toward a more color-
blind society C even if it becomes more difficult to measure progress on civil rights 
and poverty programs."' Arnitai Etzioni, The Monochrome Society 14 (Princeton U 
Press, 2001). 
60. Rita J. Simon, Transracial Adoptions: In the Children's Best Interests, Black 
Issues in Higher Education, May 4, 1995, reprinted in Congressional Record, Senate, 
104th Cong 1st Session, 141 Cong Rec S 12624 (Sept 5, 1995). 
61. Compare the cases in which courts confronted with disputes over church 
property decline to decide which groups represent the authoritative view of the 
religion's dogma. See Carl E. Schneider, Religion and Child Custody 25 Michigan J L 
Reform 879, 888-889 (1992). Cf Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the 
Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U Michigan J L Reform 751, 787 B 788 (1992): [T]here 
is something artificial about a commitment to preserve minority cultures. Cultures live 
and grow, change and sometimes wither away; they amalgamate with other cultures, or 
they adapt themselves to geographical or demographic necessity. To preserve a culture 
is often to take a favored 'snapshot' version of it, and insist that this version must 
persist at all costs .... " 
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THE CLAIMS OF THE COMMUNITY 
The task of the community (as it is represented by the 
government) is twofold: first, to nurture and mediate the claims of the 
individual, the family, and the group, second, to cherish those claims 
that promote the kind of society we aspire to. As to the competing 
claims, I have argued that Timmy would have chosen the Drummonds; 
that though Drummonds' legal position is tenuous, since they began as 
contractual foster parents, they are truly in loco parentis and ache to 
adopt Timmy; and that government has no place to look for an 
authoritative statement of how any race's interests would best be 
served. On this view, the conflicting claims should be resolved by a 
decision for the Drummonds. 
This leaves us with the second issue: What rule for children like 
Timmy would best foster the society we want? To answer this 
question, let us ask another: Why did transracial adoption, which not 
long ago was blossoming, which seemed to succor the needs of many 
black children and assuage the wants of many white adults, wither 
when attacked? Reasons abound. For example, racial matching fits 
adoption agencies' longstanding preference for matching of all kinds. 
And it fits the politics of diametrically opposed groups. The 
NABSW's hostility to transracial adoption eerily echoes the Jim Crow 
of the past and finds untoward allies in the racism of the present. Who 
said: "These unfortunate girls ... will have a much better opportunity 
to take their rightful place in society if they are brought up among their 
own people"?62 And who said: "We affirm the invioable [sic] position 
of Black children in Black families where they belong physically, 
psychologically and culturally in order that they receive the total sense 
of themselves and develop a sound projection of their future"?63 
In addition, a broader cultural development gives resonance to 
criticisms of transracial adoption. Americans increasingly think people 
cannot understand each other and thus are doomed to be strangers one 
to another. Several versions of this view enjoy cultural currency. 
First, many disciplines make opacity plausible. Freud convinced us 
that people are propelled by unconscious and non-rational drives so 
primal and painful that people do not perceive and cannot acknowledge 
them. If people mystify themselves, how can they understand each 
other? Psychology and sociology have convinced us that people are 
shaped by biological and social forces whose influence is indirect but 
inescapable - genes, parental attitudes, child-rearing practices, family 
status, education, and so on. If we cannot know what has formed our 
neighbors, we cannot understand them. And people are not just 
62. This remark is from the court in Ward v. Ward, 216 P2d 755, 756 (Wash 1950), 
explaining its decision to award custody of children of an interracial .;ouple to the 
black father. 
63. NABSW's Position on Trans-Racial Adoption, 5 National Association of Black 
Social Workers Journal 9, 9 (Summer 1973). 
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molded from without, they define themselves. This private and 
dynamic process also makes people inscrutable to each other. 
More specifically, it is a triumphing cliche that people who have 
not shared experiences cannot understand each other. Hence the 
proliferation of support groups, which unite people with shared 
experiences narrowly defined, like teenage children of alcoholic 
parents. Many people who join these groups expect true understanding 
and communion only from doppelgangers. 64 The work of providing 
intelligent sympathy once performed by generalists- friends, family, or 
clergy - now requires experts taught by specific experience (yet another 
example of the division of labor in society). 
The sense that men and women can never understand each other, 
perhaps always lively, has effervesced in recent decades. It has long 
been folk wisdom - and folk humor - that men and women think and 
act differently; today it is a leitmotif of best seller lists: e.g., Men Are 
From Mars, Women Are From Venus. That idea has acquired 
academic dignity. For example, Carol Gilligan argues that men and 
women approach moral reasoning differently, and John Townsend 
contends that evolution has led men and women to seek crucially 
different things.65 These differences are magnified by a careless slide 
from the observation that as groups men and women differ statistically 
to the assumption that every man differs tout court from every woman. 
If individuals are mutually incomprehensible, how much more so 
must be groups. On this view, America comprises cultural groups -
particularly ethnic groups -that differ monumentally, whose members 
are primarily defined by their membership, and whose members thus 
differ irreconcilably from each other. They think differently, act 
differently, are different. These differences arise from diverging 
cultural traditions and varying ways society treats groups. For 
example, "[t]here is now a virtually unchallenged presumption that, 
looking at the issue of race, blacks and whites see altogether different 
realities."66 Thus we are often instructed that black and white 
Americans not only understand a common language differently, but 
speak different languages that use different words and different 
grammar. And thus it was routinely said blacks and whites had had 
such different encounters with the police that they saw the evidence 
about OJ. Simpson in hopelessly conflicting ways that could never be 
64. For example: "All the other chronically ill people on the waiting list can't be 
wrong either. Only they and I really know how Irv can help us. It is something so 
private, inside yourself .... " Ellen Burstein MacFarlane with Patricia Burstein, 
Legwork: An Inspiring Journey Through a Chronic Illness 134 (Scribner's, 1994). Irv, 
as her family saw and Burstein later recognized, was a charlatan offering false hopes 
for high fees. 
65. What Women Want- What Men Want: Why The Sexes Still See Love & 
Commitment So Differently (Oxford U Press, 1998). 
66. Paul M. Sniderman & Edward G. Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race 135 
(Harvard U Press, 1997). 
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reconciled by reasoned argument. On a strong view of these 
perceptions, groups not only cannot understand each other, but an 
attempt to do so is an act of aggression, an attempt to arrogate the 
power to define a group instead of allowing it to define itself. 
No one doubts that people differ, that we regularly surprise even 
ourselves and certainly each other. But our mutual incomprehensibility 
is lethally exaggerated. Even blacks and whites see many contentious 
issues similarly. Thus one of the most meticulous studies of its subject 
insists that, "to an extent which deserves to be appreciated again, black 
Americans and white Americans share the same culture."67 More, "[i]t 
was emphatically not the case that blacks saw one reality of race, and 
whites another, with blacks fixing the blame for blacks being worse off 
on whites and whites pointing the finger at blacks. On the contrary, 
most cited the same factors, and to approximately the same degree."68 
In short, the differences among us are real, but they are not the 
whole story. Our similarities are numerous and strong enough to make 
possible a society of mutual concern, a society which recognizes the 
elements of common humanity that bind and oblige us to each other. 
That is the kind of society the civil rights movement in its earliest and 
in some ways most radical incarnation marvelously and movingly 
invoked. And that I believe is the kind of society the community, 
acting through the government, should wish to promote in cases like 
Drummond. And that is the kind of society the Drummond court, with 
its fixation on what might separate Timmy from his parents and its 
indifference to what might unite them, implicitly depreciated and 
deplorably discouraged. 
I opened with the parable of Drummond. Recall another parable. 
We are told that "the Jews ha[d] no dealings with the Samaritans," that 
a Jew "went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, 
which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, 
leaving him half dead," that a priest and a Levite "passed by on the 
other side, . . . [b ]ut a certain Samaritan ... had compassion on him, 
[a]nd went to him, and bound up his wounds .... " We are rhetorically 
asked, "Which now of these three ... was neighbour unto him that fell 
among the thieves?" 
CONCLUSION 
I have told two stories, both remarkable. The first is the story of 
transracial adoption. Not long ago, it seemed a modest but well 
founded solution to the needs of minority children without parents and 
the wants of couples without children. The evidence that white parents 
must fail black children is hardly more than bare assertion, while the 
evidence that transracially adopted children grow up as happily as 
67. ld. at 138. 
68. ld. at 135. 
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other adopted children is substantial. Certainly such children are better 
off than if left to the mercies of foster care. A majority of black 
Americans opposes bans of transracial adoption. And those bans (now 
tacit and even illegal, but apparently still effective) are ever more 
anachronistic in an era of mutiplying interracial marriage. And yet 
transracial adoption is resisted. 
The second remarkable story is Timmy Drummond's. I will tell 
you what I know of its end. In May 1976, during the litigation and 
when Timmy was about two and a half, the Department apparently 
took Timmy from the Drummonds and placed him with a couple of 
"mixed racial ancestry." This placement seems to have failed, and the 
last we hear is that Timmy was eventually put in yet another foster 
home with a "mixed race couple" who thought they wanted to adopt 
him.69 
The parable of Robert and Mildred Drummond and their son 
Timmy is the story of people who needed each other and who came to 
love each other. They understood each other well enough to live 
together as happily as is usually given to human beings. The 
Drummonds and Timmys of this world can be taught to regard 
themselves as irredeemably strangers. They cannot afford to. More 
broadly, it need not take the lessons of the last century, or of the last 
year, to remind us of our need for each other or our capacity for 
endless enmity. When I open the copy of Why We Can't Wait I bought 
in high school, I find underlined this closing passage from the Letter 
from Binningham Jail with which I will close today: "Let us all hope 
that the dark clouds of racial prejudice will soon pass away and the 
deep fog of misunderstanding will be lifted from our fear-drenched 
communities, and in some not too distant tomorrow the radiant stars of 
love and brotherhood will shine over our great nation with all their 
cintillating beauty." 
69. Larry I. Palmer, Adoption: A Plea for Realistic Constitutional Decisionmaking, 
11 Columbia Human Rights L Rev 1, 7 (1979). 
